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Paraphrasing Oscar Wilde, an economist is someone who knows the price of
everything and the value of nothing. For instance, in addition to the price of
widgets and doodads, economists now also claim to know the price of
marriage, children, health, education, and crime. So why not consider the price
of science? Something along these lines must have gone through James Wible’s
mind when he was writing his book on The Economics of Science.
Furthermore, Wible finds himself in a climate characterized by increasing
scrutiny and control of science, in which it is not too surprising to find appeals
to an economics of science. In fact, there are at least six groups concerned with
what one might consider to be an economics of science, namely, orthodox
economists, historians of science and technology, sociologists of science,
philosophers of science, science policy experts, and real working scientists. In
addition to surveying some of the literature provided by these groups, Wible
also develops his own contribution to economics of science.
The survey part of Wible’s book is restricted mostly to one of the six groups,
namely, philosophers of science. Going back about twelve decades, the
American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce employed what
looked like modern marginal economic analysis to evaluate scientific research
project selection. As Wible shows, Peirce’s contribution can further be
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considered as part of modern cost-benefit analysis. More recently, responding
to tendencies toward anti-foundationalism, relativism, and naturalism, philoso-
phers of science have started analyzing how scientific knowledge is constructed
out of an economic process, using market models as means of incorporating
some ‘social’ dimension. For instance, Nicholas Rescher and Gerard Radnitzky
have developed cost-benefit elaborations of Karl Popper’s philosophy of
science. However, a reasonable reading of the language of costs and benefits
would be that it gains meaning through scientists’ motivations and moves.
Hence, the lack of universal meaning of the cost-benefit metaphor makes it
difficult to use it as a serious analytical device in the process of research. In
addition, William Bartley has argued that the bias against Popper’s method-
ology is a consequence of market failure in the marketplace of ideas. However,
such an argument takes the relationship between science and markets as
unproblematic, whereas, in fact, there are several possible positions on this
issue. First, science may be an entirely self-sufficient social formation that
operates according to its own autonomous principles or norms antithetical to
the market. Second, science and markets could be two classes of self-
organizing social formations that exhibit some vague metaphorical similarities,
but operate largely independently. Third, science and markets may be two
distinct classes of social activities that depend upon one another in a symbiotic
fashion. Fourth, markets could be the general paradigm for all modern social
organization, and therefore science would then be just one special case of this
generic social structure. Finally, both science and markets may be distinct
social activities that display no intrinsic essential attributes, but have evolved in
parallel historically from their individualist handicraft origins into large-scale
multi-actor hierarchical entities. To be sure, The Economics of Science does
survey a few of these possible positions.
Wible’s own contribution first explores the idea that scientists are
economically rational. For instance, scientific misconduct in general and
replication failure in particular may be an economically rational response to the
incentive and reward structure in science, as illustrated by the allocation of time
model. Furthermore, a utility model of choice under risk may show how fraud
can be interpreted as a deliberate, calculated risk that a scientist takes to gain
a competitive advantage. Next, and this is, unfortunately, rarely recognized by
contributors to economics of science, Wible evaluates the methodological and
philosophical problems that follow from the economics of science, especially
when applied reflexively to economics. For instance, Bartley’s argument that
competition in the marketplace of ideas is good for the growth of knowledge
can be used against the monopoly power enjoyed by neoclassical economics.









































philosophy of science is used to argue for the elimination of the neoclassical
hegemony in economics. This seems a bit like throwing oneself out with one’s
own bath water” (p. 95). Still, Wible believes that science is governed by a self-
corrective long-run adjustment process. According to him, this process may
eventually lead towards an evolutionary conception of rationality in science and
economics. Unfortunately, Wible does not pursue the possible pitfalls of
reflexivity in the constitution of an economics of science in great depth. Hence,
his evaluation does not move much beyond acknowledging both strengths and
weaknesses, both possibilities and limitations, or both fertility and fruitless-
ness. Though Wible believes that immersion in economics of science ought to
lead economists into engaging in the self-referential enterprise of rethinking
their own presuppositions, he uses the argument of finite resources to limit the
exploration of infinite regresses. This is somewhat surprising, for such an
economic argument is itself subject to the pitfalls of reflexivity. Moreover, there
are other dangers that remain unexplored by Wible (see, e.g. Sent, 1999).
First, in addition to the philosophers of science discussed by Wible, there are
at least five other groups that have contributed in one way or another to some
kind of economics of science, as mentioned before, and yet there is little
dialogue among these groups. In addition, it is important to recognize that there
have been several different historical approaches to economics of science, with
the so-called newer school only starting to consolidate its position now.
Second, a distinction needs to be made between economic theory of science
and economic aspects of science. Whereas the former frequently appeals to the
economic incentives that are central to existing economic theory, research on
the latter tends to stress ‘real’ economic conditions. Too often, approaches to
economics of science slide back and forth between these two. However, an
analysis of the economic aspects of science does not have to be couched in
terms of existing economic theory. Moreover, an interaction between the two
may lead to a transformation of (parts of) existing economic theory, relying on
the reflexivity discussed by Wible. Third, economics of science can be readily
indicted for too much self-absorption, often projecting the local academic
experiences of economists themselves onto the whole of ‘science’. Much of
this deficiency can be traced to the fact that economists have very little working
familiarity with the natural sciences. Still, it could be remedied by concerted
attempts to include members of the groups discussed before in the
deliberations. Fourth, economics of science often presumes that the treatment
of ‘knowledge’ is unified within economics, whereas in fact probably the most
contentious debate within economic theory revolves around the proper
treatment of learning and information. Furthermore, economics of science
frequently equates science with knowledge and knowledge with information,








































thereby raising additional thorny issues (see, e.g. Biagioli, 1999; Boyle, 1996).
On the one hand, efficient market exchange requires free information. For
science, collectivist notions of truth promote public access and transparency.
On the other hand, optimal individual incentives require the commodification
of information. For science, the Romantic individualist episteme privileges
originality, and hence ownership. If science is equated with knowledge and if
knowledge is equated with information, then there may be no trade, or no
science, in efficient scientific markets.
Perhaps, returning to Oscar Wilde, economics of science knows the price of
science, but not its value. Maybe there are multiple valuation principles
operating simultaneously in science itself: one for truth, another for fame/
credit, and another in money terms. Despite these concerns, the choice is either
to deny that current economic transformations are having any profound
influence upon science or else to mobilize some broad-based economic
expertise in order to analyze and respond to the changes. Hence, space needs
to be opened up for a more synergetic approach to ‘science’ and the ‘economy’.
And James Wible’s The Economics of Science satisfies part of this need.
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